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The Challenges of Estimating 
Potential Output in Real Time
Robert W. Arnold
Potential output is an estimate of the level of gross domestic product attainable when the economy
is operating at a high rate of resource use. A summary measure of the economy’s productive capacity,
potential output plays an important role in the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)’s economic
forecast and projection. The author briefly describes the method the CBO uses to estimate and
project potential output, outlines some of the advantages and disadvantages of that approach, and
describes some of the challenges associated with estimating and projecting potential output. Chief
among these is the difficulty of estimating the underlying trends in economic data series that are
volatile, subject to structural change, and frequently revised. Those challenges are illustrated using
examples based on recent experience with labor force growth, the Phillips curve, and labor produc-
tivity growth. (JEL E17, E32, E62)
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falls below potential, then resources are lying
idle and inflation tends to fall. 
In addition to being a measure of aggregate
supply in the economy, potential output is also
an estimate of trend GDP. The long-term trend in
real GDP is generally upward as more resources—
primarily labor and capital—become available and
technological change allows more productive
use of existing resources. Real GDP also displays
short-term variation around that long-run trend,
influenced primarily by the business cycle but
also by random shocks whose sources are difficult
to pinpoint. Analysts often want to estimate the
underlying trend, or general momentum, in GDP
by removing short-term variation from it. A dis-
tinct, but related, objective is to remove the fluc-
tuations that arise solely from the effects of the
business cycle.
Potential output plays a role in several areas
associated with the CBO’s economic forecast. In
particular, we use potential output to set the
level of real GDP in its medium-term (or 10-year)
A
ssessing current economic conditions,
gauging inflationary pressures, and
projecting long-term economic growth
are central aspects of the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO)’s economic forecasts and
baseline projections. Those tasks require a sum-
mary measure of the economy’s productive capac-
ity. That measure, known as potential output, is
an estimate of “full-employment” gross domestic
product (GDP)—the level of GDP attainable when
the economy is operating at a high rate of resource
use. Although it is a measure of the productive
capacity of the economy, potential output is not
a technical ceiling on output that cannot be
exceeded. Rather, it is a measure of sustainable
output, where the intensity of resource use is
neither adding to nor subtracting from short-run
inflationary pressure. If actual output exceeds
its potential level, then constraints on capacity
begin to bind, restraining further growth and
contributing to inflationary pressure. If output
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between GDP and potential GDP will equal zero
on average in the medium term. Therefore, the
CBO projects that any gap that remains at the end
of the short-term (or two-year) forecast will close
during the following eight years. We also use the
level of potential output as one gauge of inflation-
ary pressures in the near term. For example, an
increase in inflation that occurs when real GDP is
below potential (and monetary growth is moder-
ate) can probably be attributed to temporary fac-
tors and is unlikely to persist. Finally, potential
output is an important input in computing the
standardized-budget surplus or deficit, which the
CBO uses to evaluate the stance of fiscal policy
and reports regularly as part of its mandate.
THE CBO METHOD FOR 
ESTIMATING POTENTIAL OUTPUT
The CBO model for estimating potential out-
put is based on the framework of a neoclassical,
or Solow, growth model. The model includes a
Cobb-Douglas production function for the non-
farm business (NFB) sector with two factor inputs,
labor (measured as hours worked) and capital
(measured as an index of capital services pro-
vided by the physical capital stock), and total
factor productivity (TFP), which is calculated as
a residual. NFB is by far the largest sector in the
economy, accounting for 76 percent of GDP in
2007, compared with less than 10 percent for each
of the other sectors. For smaller sectors of the
economy, including farms, federal government,
state and local government, households, and non-
profit institutions, simpler equations are used to
model output. Those equations generally relate
the growth of output in a sector to the growth of
the factor input—either capital or labor—that is
more important for production in that sector.1
To compute historical values for potential out-
put, we cyclically adjust the factor inputs and
then combine them using the production function.
Cyclical adjustment removes the variation in a
series that is attributable solely to business cycle
fluctuations. Ideally, the resulting series will
reflect not only the trend in the series, but also
will be benchmarked to some measure of capacity
in the economy and, therefore, can be interpreted
as the potential level of the series.
For most variables in the model, we use a
cyclic-adjustment equation that combines a rela-
tionship based on Okun’s law with linear time
trends to produce potential values for the factor
inputs. Okun (1970) postulated an inverse rela-
tionship between the size of the output gap (the
percentage difference between GDP and potential
GDP) and the size of the unemployment gap (the
difference between the unemployment rate and
the “natural” rate of unemployment). According
to that relationship, actual output exceeds its
potential level when the unemployment rate is
below the natural rate of unemployment and falls
short of potential output when the unemployment
rate is above its natural rate (Figure 1).
For the natural rate of unemployment, we use
the CBO estimate of the non-accelerating inflation
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). That rate corre-
sponds to a particular notion of full employment—
the rate of unemployment that is consistent with
a stable rate of inflation. The historical estimate
of the NAIRU derives from an estimated relation-
ship known as a Phillips curve, which connects
the change in inflation to the unemployment rate
and other variables, including changes in produc-
tivity trends, oil price shocks, and wage and price
controls. The historical relationship between the
unemployment gap and the change in the rate of
inflation appears to have weakened since the mid-
1980s.2 However, a negative correlation still exists;
when the unemployment rate is below the NAIRU,
inflation tends to rise, and when it exceeds the
NAIRU, inflation tends to fall. Consequently, the
NAIRU, while it is less useful for inflation fore-
casts, is still useful as a benchmark for potential
output.
The assumption of linear time trends in the
cyclic-adjustment equation implies that the poten-
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1 This section gives an overview of the CBO method. For a more
complete description, see CBO (2001).
2 For a description of the procedure used to estimate the NAIRU,
see Arnold (2008).tial version of each variable grows at a constant
rate during each historical business cycle. Rather
than constraining the potential series to follow a
single time trend throughout the entire sample,
the model allows for several time trends, each
beginning at the peak of a business cycle. Defining
the intervals of the time trends using full business
cycles helps to ensure that the trends are estimated
consistently throughout the historical sample.
Most economic variables have distinct cyclical
patterns—they behave differently at different
points in the business cycle. Specifying break-
points for the trends that occur at different stages
of different business cycles (say, from trough to
peak) would likely provide a misleading view of
the underlying trend.
The cyclic-adjustment equation has the follow-
ing form:
(1)         
where  X = the series to be cyclically adjusted,
U = unemployment rate,
U* = NAIRU, and
log Constant X U U
T T





1 1953 2 1957 8 8 1990 T +ε,
Ti = zero until the business-cycle peak 
occurring in year i, after which it equals 
the number of quarters elapsed since that
peak.
Equation (1), a piecewise linear regression,
is estimated using quarterly data and ordinary
least squares. Potential values for the series being
adjusted are calculated as the fitted values from
the regression, with U constrained to equal U*.
Setting the unemployment rate to equal the NAIRU
removes the estimated effects of fluctuations in
the business cycle; the resulting estimate gives
the equation’s prediction of what the dependent
variable (X) would be if the unemployment rate
never deviated from the NAIRU. An example of
the results of using the cyclic-adjustment equa-
tion is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows TFP
and potential TFP.
One question that arises is when to add a new
trend break to the equation. Typically, we do not
add a new breakpoint immediately after a business
cycle peak because doing so would create, at least
initially, a very short trend segment for the period
after the peak. Such a segment would be subject
to large swings as new data points were added
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Okun’s Law: The Output Gap and the Unemployment Gap
NOTE: Gray bars in Figures 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 indicate recession as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research.to the sample because it was so short, at least
initially. Because the final segment of the trend
is carried forward into the projection, those swings
would create instability to our medium-term pro-
jections. Consequently, we typically wait until a
full business cycle has concluded before adding
a new break to the trend. For example, the model
does not yet include a break in 2001, though the
addition of one appears to be increasingly likely.
Equation (1) is used for most, but not all,
inputs in the model. One important exception is
the capital input, which does not need to be cycli-
cally adjusted to create a “potential” level because
the unadjusted capital input already represents
its potential contribution to output. Although use
of the capital stock varies greatly during the busi-
ness cycle, the potential flow of capital services
is always related to the total size of the capital
stock, not to the amount currently being used.
Other exceptions include several variables of
lesser importance that do not vary with the busi-
ness cycle. Those series are smoothed using the
Hodrick-Prescott filter.
As noted earlier, the method for computing
historical values of potential output in the other
sectors of the economy differs slightly from that
used for the NFB sector. In general, the approach
is to express real GDP in each of the other sectors
as a function of the primary factor input (either
labor or capital) in that sector and the productivity
of that input. The potential levels of the primary
input and its productivity are cyclically adjusted
using an analog to equation (1) and then combined
to estimate potential output in that sector. The
list below describes how each sector is modeled.
• Farm sector: Potential GDP in this sector is
modeled as a function of potential farm
employment and potential output per
employee.
• Government sector: Potential GDP in this
sector is the sum of potential GDP in the
federal government and state and local
governments. Potential GDP at each level
of government equals the sum of the com-
pensation of general government employ-
ees (adjusted to potential) and government
depreciation. Compensation is modeled as
a function of total employment, and com-
pensation per employee and depreciation
is modeled as a function of the government
capital stock.
• Nonprofit sector: Potential GDP in this
sector is modeled as a function of potential
Arnold











1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005




TFP and Potential TFPnonprofit employment and potential output
per employee.
• Household sector: Although some of the
GDP in the household sector consists of
the compensation of domestic workers, the
majority is composed of imputed rent on
owner-occupied housing. As such, output
in this sector is composed of a stream of
housing services provided almost entirely
from the capital stock. Potential GDP in this
sector is modeled as a function of the stock
of owner-occupied housing and an estimate
of the productivity of that stock. Similar
to the capital input in the NFB sector, the
housing capital stock is not adjusted to
potential because the unadjusted stock
reflects the potential contribution to output.
For projections of potential output, the same
framework is used for these sectors as is used for
the NFB sector. Given projections of several exoge-
nous variables—of which potential labor force,
potential TFP growth, and the national saving
rate are the most important—the growth model
computes the capital stock endogenously and
combines the factor inputs into an estimate of
potential output. In most cases, projecting the
exogenous variables is straightforward: The CBO
generally extrapolates the trend growth rate from
recent history through the 10-year projection
period. However, the projections for some exoge-
nous variables, most notably the saving rate, are
taken from the CBO economic forecast.
Advantages and Disadvantages of the
CBO Method
The CBO method for estimating and project-
ing potential output has several key advantages.
First, it looks explicitly at the supply side of the
economy. Potential output is a measure of pro-
ductive capacity, so any estimate of it is likely to
benefit from explicit dependence on factors of
production. For example, if growth in the avail-
able pool of labor increases, then this method
will show an acceleration in potential output (all
other things being equal). With our approach, an
increase in investment spending would also be
reflected in faster growth in productive capacity.
Another advantage of a growth model is that it
allows for a transparent accounting of the sources
of growth. Such a growth-accounting exercise,
which divides the growth of potential GDP into
the contributions from each of the factor inputs, is
especially useful when explaining the factors that
caused a change to CBO projections. A growth-
accounting exercise for our current projection is
shown in Table 1.3 The table displays the growth
rates of potential output and its components for
the overall economy and the NFB sector. Note that
the growth rates of the factor inputs (top and mid-
dle panels of the table) are not weighted; they do
not sum to the growth in potential output.
A third advantage of using a growth model
to calculate potential output is that it supplies a
projection for potential output that is consistent
with the CBO projection for the federal budget.
That consistency allows the CBO to incorporate
the effects of changes in fiscal policy into its
medium-term (10-year) economic and budget
projections. Fiscal policy has obvious effects on
aggregate demand in the short run, effects that are
reflected in our short-term forecast. However,
fiscal policy will also influence the growth in
potential output over the medium term through its
effect on national saving and capital accumulation.
Because the growth model explicitly includes
capital as a factor of production, it captures that
effect.
Table 1 also shows the contribution of each
factor input to the growth of potential output in
the NFB sector by weighting each input’s growth
rate by its coefficient in the production function.
The sum of the contributions equals the growth
of potential output in the NFB sector. Computing
the contributions to growth highlights the sources
of any quickening or slowdown in growth. For
example, the CBO estimates that potential output
in the NFB sector grew at an average annual rate
of 3.3 percent during the 1982-90 period and 3.5
percent during the 1991-2001 period. That accel-
eration can be attributed to faster growth in the
capital input (which contributed 1.2 percentage
points to the growth of potential output during
the first period and 1.4 percentage points in the
Arnold
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3 See CBO (2008).Arnold



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.second) and faster growth of potential TFP (which
contributed 0.9 and 1.3 percentage points to the
growth of potential output during the two periods,
respectively). Faster growth in those two factors
more than offset a slowdown in potential hours
worked between the two periods. This point is
addressed later.
Fourth, by using a disaggregated approach,
the CBO method can reveal more insights about
the economy than a more-aggregated model would.
For example, the model calculates the capital
input to the production function as a weighted
average of the services provided by seven types
of capital. Those data indicate a shift over the
past few decades to capital goods with shorter
service lives: A larger share of total fixed invest-
ment is going to producers’ durable equipment
(PDE) relative to structures, and a larger share of
PDE is going to computers and other information
technology (IT) capital. Because shorter-lived
capital goods depreciate more rapidly, the shift
toward PDE and IT capital increases the share of
investment dollars used to replace worn-out capi-
tal and tends to lower net investment and the
capital input. Shorter-lived capital goods are also
more productive per year of service life than those
that last longer and are therefore weighted more
heavily in the growth model’s capital input. A
model that ignores the capital input or that does
not disaggregate capital is likely to miss both of
those effects.
On the negative side, the simplicity of our
model could be perceived as a drawback. The
model uses some parameters—most notably, the
coefficients on labor and capital in the production
function—that are imposed rather than econo-
metrically estimated. Although that approach is
standard practice in the growth-accounting liter-
ature (in part because it has empirical support),
it is tantamount to assuming the magnitude of
the contribution that each factor input makes to
growth. With such an approach, the magnitude
of that contribution will not change from year to
year as the economy evolves, as it would in an
econometrically estimated model. Moreover, it
requires some strong assumptions that may not
be consistent with the data.
A second disadvantage of using a growth
model to estimate potential output is that includ-
ing the capital stock introduces measurement
error. Most economic variables are subject to meas-
urement error, but the problem is particularly
acute for capital, for two basic reasons. First, meas-
uring the stock of any particular type of capital
is difficult because depreciation is hard to define
or measure. Purchases of plant and equipment can
be tallied to produce a historical series for invest-
ment, but no corresponding source of data exists
for depreciation. Second, even if accurate esti-
mates of individual stocks were available, aggre-
gating them into a single index would be difficult
because capital is heterogeneous, differing with
respect to characteristics such as durability and
productivity.4
A third point of contention regarding the CBO
approach is the use of deterministic time trends
to cyclically adjust many variables in the model.
Some analysts assert that relying on fixed time
trends provides a misleading view of the cyclical
behavior of some economic time series. They
argue, on the basis of empirical studies of the
business cycle, that using variable rather than
fixed time trends is more appropriate for most
data series.5 However, the evidence on this point
is mixed—it is very difficult to determine whether
the trend in a data series is deterministic or sto-
chastic using existing econometric techniques—
and the methods used to estimate stochastic trends
often yield results that are not useful for estimat-
ing potential output. That is, stochastic trends
tend to produce estimates of the output gap that
are not consistent with other indicators of the
business cycle.
Fourth, the CBO growth model is based on
an estimate of the amount of slack in the labor
market, which in turn requires an estimate of the
natural rate of unemployment or the NAIRU. Such
Arnold
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4 The CBO capital input uses capital stock estimates (and the associ-
ated assumptions about depreciation) from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis and uses an aggregation equation that is based on the
approach used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to construct
the capital input that underlies the multifactor productivity series.
The CBO estimate of the capital input is quite similar to that calcu-
lated by the BLS.
5 See, for example, Stock and Watson (1988).estimates are highly uncertain. Few economists
would claim that they can confidently identify
the current NAIRU to within a percentage point.
Our method is not very sensitive to possible
errors in the average level of the estimated NAIRU,
but it is sensitive to errors in identifying how that
level changes from year to year.
Finally, the CBO model does not contain
explicit channels of influence for all major effects
of government policy on potential output. For
example, it does not include an explicit link
between tax rates and labor supply, productivity,
or the personal saving rate; nor does it include
any link between changes in regulatory policy
and those variables. However, that does not mean
that the model precludes a relationship between
policy changes and any of those variables. If a
given policy change is estimated to be large
enough to affect the incentives governing work
effort, productivity, or saving, then those effects
can be included in our projection or in a policy
simulation by adjusting the relevant variable in
the model. For example, changes in marginal tax
rates have the potential to affect labor supply.
Because the Solow model does not explicitly
model the factors that affect the labor input, our
model includes a separate adjustment to incor-
porate such effects. Indeed, for the past several
years, such an adjustment has been included in
our model to account for the effects on the labor
supply of the scheduled expiration in 2011 of the
tax laws passed in 2001 and 2003. The structure
of our model makes it easier to isolate (and incor-
porate) the effects of such policy changes than




Potential output plays a key role in the CBO
economic forecast and projection. Perhaps the
two most important are estimating the output gap
(percentage difference between GDP and potential
GDP) and providing a target for the 10-year pro-
jection of GDP. Important challenges are associated
with both roles.
Challenges Associated with Estimating
the Output Gap
Any method used to estimate the trend in a
series, including potential output, is subject to
an “end-of-sample” problem, which means that
estimating the trend is especially difficult near
the end of a data sample. In the case of the output
gap, this is usually the period of greatest interest.
Three examples from the period since 2000 illus-
trate the difficulties associated with estimating
the level of potential output at the end of the
sample period.
Potential Labor Force. Fundamentally, the
amount of hours worked in the economy is deter-
mined by the size of the labor force, which, in
turn, is largely influenced by two factors: growth
in the population and the rate of labor force par-
ticipation. Neither of those series is especially
sensitive to business cycle fluctuations, but both
are subject to considerable low-frequency varia-
tion. The discussion here focuses on how the rate
of labor force participation has changed during
recent years and how we have modified the CBO
labor force projections as a result.
After a long-running rise that started in the
early 1960s, the labor force participation rate
plateaued at about 67 percent of the civilian pop-
ulation during the late 1990s, declined sharply
between 2000 and 2003, and varied in a narrow
range near 66 percent between 2003 and 2008
(Figure 3). Had that decline in the participation
rate not occurred, the labor force would have
had approximately 2.3 million more workers in
2008 than it actually did.
To assess its impact on potential output, the
challenge during the early 2000s was to determine
whether the decline in the participation rate was
cyclical (i.e., workers had dropped out of the labor
force because their prospects of getting a job
were dim) or structural (i.e., prospective labor
force participants had weighed the alternatives
and found that options such as education, retire-
ment, or child-rearing were more attractive). If
the decline were due to cyclical reasons, then the
dip in participation should not be reflected in the
estimate of potential labor force. If the decline
were due to structural reasons, however, then the
Arnold
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output should be lowered to reflect the decreased
size of the potential workforce.
The drop in the participation rate also com-
plicated the interpretation of movements in the
unemployment rate, which peaked at 6.1 per-
cent in mid-2003 and declined thereafter. During
2006 and 2007, the unemployment rate was
below 5 percent, which suggested considerable
tightness in the labor market. However, the
decline in the participation rate implied that
there existed a pool of untapped labor that could
have been drawn into the workforce had there
been a significant speedup in the pace of job cre-
ation. Consequently, at that time, the unemploy-
ment rate probably understated the degree of
slack that existed in the labor market. Indeed, in
the early stages of the expansion following the
2001 recession, we projected that the participa-
tion rate would recover as job creation picked
up. It never did though, and the CBO has since
concluded that the decline in the participation
rate was more structural than cyclical.6
Potential NFB Employment. The second chal-
lenge is associated with the behavior of employ-
ment since the end of the 2001 recession and its
implications for the estimate of potential hours
worked in the NFB sector. One striking feature of
the economic landscape since the 2001 business
cycle trough is very weak growth in employment,
especially for measures derived from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics’ establishment survey. For
example, since the trough in the fourth quarter
of 2001, growth in nonfarm payroll employment
averaged 0.8 percent at an annual rate, which
means that payrolls were roughly 5 percent higher
in the second quarter of 2008 than they were at
the end of the 2001 recession. However, based on
patterns in past cycles, one would have expected
much faster growth in payroll employment—2.4
percent on average—and a much higher level of
employment—17 percent higher than its trough
value—by the second quarter of 2008 (Figure 4).
A similar pattern holds for employment in
the NFB sector (which differs from the headline
payroll number by excluding employees in pri-
vate households and nonprofit institutions and
including proprietors). In the second quarter of
2008, NFB employment was about 4 percent above
Arnold
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Figure 5
NFB Sector Employment as a Percent of the Civilian Labor Forceits level at the end of the 2001 recession. Had it
grown according to the pattern seen in a typical
business cycle expansion, it would have been
about 15 percent higher than its level at the trough
of the recession.
The behavior of NFB employment since the
business cycle peak in 2001 also looks very
unusual when viewed from another perspective.
When measured as a share of the labor force
(which controls for the decline in the rate of labor
force participation), NFB employment barely
grew during the expansion that followed the 2001
recession (Figure 5). This is extremely unusual
on two counts. First, it departs from the very
strong procyclical pattern seen in most recovery
and expansion periods. Typically, NFB sector
employment grows much faster than the labor
force during business cycle expansions, which
causes a rapid increase in its share. Second, the
recent behavior breaks with the long-standing
upward trend in the NFB share of the labor force.
Since roughly the mid-1970s, trend growth in NFB
employment has exceeded trend growth in the
labor force on average, leading to a steady increase
in the share. Examining the peaks is a rough-and-
ready way to control for business cycle variation:
The share increased from about 74 percent in
1973, to just under 75 percent in 1979, to just
over 76 percent in 1989, to just under 80 percent
in 1999.
After the trough in 2001, the share of NFB
employment declined for another two years and
then increased somewhat but not anything like
a normal cyclical rebound. The reasons for this
behavior are not fully clear—shifts of employment
to other sectors, including government and non-
profit institutions, can explain only part of the
shortfall—but it has important implications for
the estimate of potential employment and hours
worked. Specifically, the estimate of potential
employment in the NFB sector is much lower than
it would have been had actual NFB employment
followed a more typical cyclical pattern since 2001.
To illustrate this point, consider what the NFB
employment share would have looked like had it
followed a more typical cyclical pattern. Figure 6
shows NFB employment as a share of the labor
force along with two counterfactual paths for the
share. The thin solid line shows the evolution of
the NFB employment share had it grown since
2001 at the same rate as an “average” historical
expansion. That path embodies much stronger
Arnold
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Figure 6
NFB Employment as a Percent of the Civilian Labor Force and Two Counterfactual Pathsemployment growth than does the actual path
and would imply a much higher level of potential
employment as well. Arguably, that path is too
strong, given that employment growth has been
sluggish in the recoveries that followed the past
two recessions. So the figure includes a second
counterfactual path (dotted line) showing the
evolution of the NFB employment share had it
grown as it did during the expansion of the 1990s.
It too implies much stronger employment growth
than actually occurred.
For the first few years of the current business
cycle, it was reasonable to expect a typical rebound
in the NFB employment share, even if it was
delayed relative to past expansions. If so, then the
period of sluggish growth in NFB employment
could be interpreted as a cyclical pattern and
would not necessarily imply that the level of
potential NFB employment was lower. However,
as the period of sluggish growth grew longer and
in light of the possibility of a business cycle peak
in early 2008, the position that NFB employment
would eventually rebound became increasingly
untenable.
Instead, it seems increasingly likely that NFB
employment will merely match the growth in the
labor force in the future, rather than grow at a faster
pace. One implication of that interpretation is that
the experience of the late 1990s, when the NFB
employment share of the labor force was very
high, was unusual and is unlikely to be repeated.
Changes in the Phillips Curve and NAIRU.
As noted previously, the natural rate of unemploy-
ment is an important input in the CBO model. It
serves as the benchmark used to estimate the
potential values of the factor inputs and, conse-
quently, potential output. Any uncertainties
associated with the size of the unemployment
gap, or difference between the unemployment
rate and the natural rate, will translate directly
into uncertainty about the size of the output gap.
Our estimate of the natural rate, known as
the NAIRU, is based on a standard Phillips curve,
which relates changes in inflation to the unem-
ployment rate, expected inflation, and various
supply shock variables. In particular, the NAIRU
estimate relies on the existence of a negative cor-
relation between inflation and unemployment: If
inflation tends to rise when the unemployment
rate is low and tends to fall when the unemploy-
ment rate is high, then there must be an unem-
ployment rate at which there is no tendency for
inflation to rise or fall. This does not mean that
the rate is stable or that it is precisely estimated,
just that it must exist.
However, during the past 20 or so years, sig-
nificant changes in how the economy functions
have affected the relationship between inflation
and unemployment and, consequently, estimates
of the Phillips curve and the NAIRU. Most notably,
the rate of inflation has been lower and much less
volatile since the mid-1980s, a phenomenon often
referred to as the Great Moderation. At the same
time, the unemployment rate has trended down-
ward, which suggests that the natural rate of
unemployment has declined also. Researchers had
identified several factors that would be expected
to lower the natural rate, including the changing
demographic composition of the workforce,
changes in disability policies, and improved effi-
ciency of the labor market’s matching process.
Based on internal evaluation of those factors, the
CBO began to lower its estimate of the NAIRU for
the period since 1990, overriding the econometric
estimate at that time.7
More recent Phillips curve estimates are con-
sistent with the hypothesis that a change occurred
sometime during the past 20 or so years. In a
recent working paper, I presented regression
results from estimates of several Phillips curve
specifications that suggested the presence of sig-
nificant structural change since the mid-1980s.8
Using the full data sample, from 1955 through
2007, the equations’ performance appeared to be
satisfactory. They fit the data well and their esti-
mated coefficients had the correct sign, were of
reasonable magnitude, and were statistically sig-
nificant. However, the full-sample regressions
masked evidence of a breakdown in performance
that began during the mid-1980s. Estimation
results from equations that allowed for structural
change indicated that the fit of the equations dete-
7 That analysis was later summarized in a CBO paper; see Brauer
(2007).
8 See Arnold (2008).
Arnold
282 JULY/AUGUST 2009 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEWArnold
























Married-Male Unemployment Rate (percent)
Married-Male Unemployment Rate (percent)
Figure 7
Married-Male Unemployment and the Change in Inflation
NOTE: The change in inflation is defined as the difference between the quarterly rate of inflation in the personal consumption
expenditure (PCE) price index and a 24-quarter moving average of PCE inflation.riorated and that the coefficients were smaller and
less statistically significant during the latter part
of the data sample than they were during the ear-
lier part. In general, the results suggest that the
NAIRU is lower now than it had been during the
period from 1955 through the mid-1980s, a con-
clusion consistent with evidence from the labor
market suggesting a decline in the natural rate.
The results also indicate that the Phillips curve
has become less useful for predicting inflation.
However, the relationship between inflation
and unemployment, though not as strong as it
once was, has not collapsed completely. Consider
Figure 7, which plots changes in a measure of
unanticipated inflation against the married-male
unemployment rate. The top panel shows data
from the 1957-90 period, while the bottom panel
shows data from 1991 through 2007.9 Comparing
the two panels reveals four features of the latter
period. First, both graphs show a negative corre-
lation between the two series, so there still appears
to be a tradeoff between inflation and unemploy-
ment. Second, the point at which the regression
line intersects the horizontal-axis intercept has
moved to the left in the second panel, which is
consistent with the idea that the NAIRU is lower
now than it had been earlier. Third, the slope of
the trend line is lower during the second part of
the sample, which suggests that the inflation-
unemployment tradeoff is somewhat flatter during
the second period (i.e., inflation is less responsive
to changes in the unemployment rate). Fourth,
much less variation has occurred in both inflation
and unemployment during the past 20 or so years
than previously.
What do these observations imply for the esti-
mate of potential output? The first observation—
that a negative correlation still exists—means that
the unemployment rate is still consistent with a
stable rate of inflation. The second observation—
that the NAIRU has declined—implies that the
level of potential output is higher than it would
have been had the NAIRU been constant. This
observation also serves as a reminder that struc-
tural change in macro equations is a fact of life.
It is important to monitor such equations contin-
ually to identify how economic events will affect
their conclusions. The final two observations
imply that Phillips curves, and by extension the
NAIRU and potential output, are less useful indi-
cators of inflationary pressure than they once were.
Challenges Associated with Projecting
Potential Output
Potential output is used for more than gauging
the state of the business cycle. It is also used to
set the path for real GDP in the 10-year forecast
that underlies the CBO budget projections. A sep-
arate set of challenges is associated with project-
ing the variables that underlie our estimate of
potential output.
Projecting Labor Productivity I: The Late-
1990s’ Acceleration. Labor productivity growth
during the late 1990s provides an important exam-
ple of the challenges associated with projecting
potential GDP.10 The broad outlines of the story
are familiar: After a long period of sluggish growth,
labor productivity accelerated sharply during the
second half of the 1990s and continued to grow
rapidly during the 2000s. Moreover, the upswing
was substantial. Trend growth in labor produc-
tivity averaged 2.7 percent between the end of
1995 and the middle of 2008, considerably faster
than the 1.4 percent pace from 1974 to 1995
(Figure 8). Had it followed that pre-1996 trend of
1.4 percent instead of growing as it did, labor
productivity would be 15 percent lower than it
is today. Furthermore, if the 2.7 percent trend is
sustained over the next decade, then the level of
real GDP will be nearly 30 percent higher in 2018
than the level that would have resulted from the
pre-1996 rate of growth.
One problem for forecasters was that the pro-
ductivity acceleration was largely unexpected.
In the mid-1990s, few analysts anticipated such
a dramatic increase in the trend rate of growth.
10 In our model, we actually project potential TFP—the projection
for potential labor productivity is implied by the projections for
potential TFP and capital accumulation.
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9 The working paper estimated Phillips curve equations using differ-
ent price indices and used Chow tests to determine when the
structural break occurred in each equation. For the personal con-
sumption expenditures price index, the break was found in 1991.
The married-male unemployment rate was used in the estimation
because it is better insulated from demographic shifts than the
overall unemployment rate.In January 1995, for example, the CBO projected
that labor productivity growth would average
1.3 percent annually for the 1995-2000 period, a
pace similar to the average for the prior 20 years.
The Clinton administration and the Blue Chip
Consensus of private forecasters projected similar
rates of growth.
Another problem for forecasters was that the
productivity surge in the late 1990s went unrec-
ognized until very late in the decade for two basic
reasons. First, labor productivity is fairly volatile,
with growth rates that can swing widely from
quarter to quarter. As a result, a period of two or
three years is a short window within which to
discern a new trend. Moreover, the acceleration
followed a period of subpar growth (productivity
growth averaged only 0.22 percent annually
between the end of 1992 and 1995:Q3); so, ini-
tially, the faster growth appeared to be just making
up lost ground rather than establishing a new,
higher trend growth rate. The postwar data sam-
ple includes several episodes of faster- or slower-
than-trend productivity growth that were later
reversed.
Second, early vintages of productivity data
for the late 1990s proved to be understated and,
therefore, painted a misleading picture of the
productivity trend. Only after several revisions
did a stronger pattern emerge. Using real-time data
culled from our forecast databases, Table 2 shows
that data available in 1996, 1997, and 1998 showed
only a small rise in productivity growth starting
in late 1995. For example, data available in early
1997 showed labor productivity growing by only
0.3 percent on average from 1995:Q4 through
1996:Q3. The story changes markedly using cur-
rently available data: Labor productivity growth
for that period was actually 3 percent.
A similar case holds for 1998 and 1999. Data
available in January 1998 showed labor produc-
tivity growth averaging 1.8 percent between
1995:Q4 and 1997:Q3. That rate has since been
revised upward by 0.6 percentage points, to 2.4
percent. The growth rate for the three-year period
ending in 1998:Q3 also has been revised from 2.0
percent (using data from early 1999) to 2.5 percent
(using currently available data).
The information in Table 2 highlights an
important point. Productivity data are revised
frequently, and the revisions can be large enough
to alter analyses of trends in productivity growth.
Indeed, after being revised upward several times
during the late 1990s, productivity data have been
revised downward somewhat during recent years.
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Figure 8
Labor Productivity Growth and Trend (1950-2008)In January 2000, labor productivity growth for
1995:Q4 to 1999:Q3 was estimated at 2.7 percent;
that estimate has since been revised to 2.4 percent.
The revisions to productivity data highlight
the difficulty in recognizing a change in the under-
lying trend growth rate and suggest that we should
be circumspect about data series until they have
undergone revision. This is especially true if the
data show a shift in trend (as in the late 1990s)
or if they are not consistent with other economic
indicators.
Projecting Labor Productivity II: Shifting
Sources of Growth. Another aspect of labor pro-
ductivity growth during the past decade—a shift
in its sources—has complicated the analysis of
trends and made projections difficult. With our
model we can easily divide the growth in labor
productivity into two components: capital deepen-
ing (increases in the amount of capital available
per worker) and TFP. Capital per worker can rise
over time not only because investment provides
more capital goods for workers to use, but also
because the quality of those goods improves over
time and investment can shift from assets with
relatively low levels of productivity (e.g., factories)
to those with higher productivity levels (e.g., com-
puters). Because TFP is calculated as a residual—
the growth contributions of labor and capital are
subtracted from the growth in output—any growth
in labor productivity that is not attributed to capi-
tal deepening will be assigned to TFP.
With this in mind, the contributions of capital
deepening and TFP to the growth in labor produc-
tivity since 1995 can be calculated. The results
of such a growth-accounting exercise are shown
in Table 3. Those results show that capital deep-
ening was the primary source of the surge in labor
productivity growth in the late 1990s and that
faster TFP growth was the primary source of pro-
ductivity growth during the period after the
business cycle peak in 2001. Between the early
(1991-95) and the late (1996-2001) part of the
past decade, labor productivity growth stepped
up from about 1.5 percent, on average, to 2.5
percent per year. Growth in capital per worker
accounted for 80 percent (0.8 percentage points)
of that 1-percentage-point increase, according to
our estimates. Faster TFP growth was responsible
for the rest of the step-up in productivity growth,
or about 0.2 percentage points.
Since the 2001 recession, however, the sources
of labor productivity growth have completely
reversed. Business investment fell substantially
in 2001 and 2002 and remained weak in 2003,
thus slowing the growth in capital deepening
relative to that in the late 1990s. Consequently,
the contribution of capital per worker to labor
productivity growth fell by 0.7 percentage points
between 2001 and 2005 relative to the 1996-2001
period. At the same time, however, TFP growth
was accelerating sharply, especially in 2003. The
CBO estimates that TFP was responsible for all
Arnold
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Table 2
Changes in Estimates of Average Annual Growth Rate for Labor Productivity
Average annual rate of growth (%)
Initial estimate Current estimate Revision
Date of forecast Period (using original data) (using current data) (percentage points)
January 1997 1995:Q4–1996:Q3 0.3 3.0 2.7
January 1998 1995:Q4–1997:Q3 1.8 2.4 0.6
January 1999 1995:Q4–1998:Q3 2.0 2.5 0.5
January 2000 1995:Q4–1999:Q3 2.7 2.4 –0.3
NOTE: Each forecast is based on productivity data that extend through the third quarter of the previous year. Numbers in the table
may not add up to totals because of rounding.
SOURCE: CBO based on data from the BLS.of the acceleration in labor productivity in the
2001-06 period.
A natural question is whether labor produc-
tivity will grow as rapidly over the next 10 years
as during the past decade. But the experience since
1995 illustrates why that question is so hard to
answer. Labor productivity growth is volatile, its
measurement is subject to large revisions, and the
reasons for changes in its rate of growth are not
well understood. Consequently, it is a difficult
variable to forecast; past patterns and recent data
provide only a rough guide to future labor produc-
tivity. Explanations for the recent acceleration
help to determine whether any of the changes to
growth since 1995 will reverse or recur in the
next 10 years.
Projecting Labor Productivity III: Explaining
the Acceleration. Although it is hard to say con-
clusively that one factor is the sole cause of the
post-1995 acceleration in productivity growth,
most economists point to IT as the primary source.
This case is easiest for the late 1990s and more
difficult for the period since 2001. As noted pre-
viously, the majority of the productivity acceler-
ation for 1996-2000 can be attributed to capital
deepening, which was one result of a huge increase
in business investment. During the late 1990s, not
only did investment boom, but it was heavily
tilted toward IT capital (Figure 9). The CBO
estimates suggest that faster capital deepening
accounted for 80 percent of the upswing in labor
productivity growth during the late 1990s and
that IT capital accounted for 75 percent of the
contribution from capital deepening.
In addition, it appears that rapid technological
change in IT industries (including computers,
software, and telecommunications) caused faster
TFP growth in those industries. It also appears
that the pace of technological change was fast
enough, and those industries were large enough,
for faster TFP growth in that sector of the economy
to support overall TFP growth during the late
1990s.11 However, because TFP growth did not
accelerate during the late 1990s, it appears that
faster TFP growth in the IT sectors merely offset
slower TFP growth elsewhere.
It is somewhat harder to make the case that IT
spending was the primary source of the continued
rapid growth in labor productivity since the busi-
ness cycle peak in 2001. One obvious problem
with this explanation is that spending on IT capital
collapsed after 2000, which strongly suggests that
IT capital was not the reason for the continued
surge. According to our estimates, nearly 80 per-
cent of the post-2001 growth in labor productivity
can be attributed to TFP, with only 20 percent
accounted for by capital deepening.
Despite those estimates, the continued growth
in labor productivity could still be the result of
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Table 3
Contributions of Capital Deepening and TFP to Labor Productivity Growth (1990-2006)
Average annual growth rate
Change
1991-95 to 1996-2001 to
1991-95 1996-2001 2002-06 1996-2001 2002-06
Contribution of capital deepening 0.50 1.33 0.62 0.83 –0.72
(percentage points)
Contribution of TFP growth  1.04 1.21 2.07 0.18 0.86
(percentage points)
Labor productivity (%) 1.54 2.54 2.65 1.00 0.11
NOTE: Numbers in the table may not add up to totals because of rounding.
SOURCE: CBO using data from the BLS and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
11 According to estimates by Oliner and Sichel (2000), for example,
the computer and semiconductor industries accounted for about
half of TFP growth from 1996 through 1999, even though those
industries composed only about 2.5 percent of GDP in the NFB
sector during those years.IT spending if a lag exists between the time when
the capital is installed and when businesses
achieve productivity gains. Several theories, not
necessarily mutually exclusive, have been pro-
posed to explain why such a delay could occur.
They include the possibility that there are adjust-
ment costs associated with large changes in the
capital stock; the possibility that computers are
an example of a general-purpose technology, like
dynamos and electric motors, that fundamentally
change the way businesses operate but take time
to produce results; and the possibility that there
is a link between IT spending and investment in
intangible capital, which refers to spending that
is intended to increase future output more than
current production but does not result in owner-
ship of a physical asset. As computing power
becomes cheaper and more pervasive, managers
can invent new business processes, work prac-
tices, and organizational structures, which in turn
allow companies to produce entirely new goods
and services or to improve their existing products’
convenience, quality, or variety.
All of these theories could explain the increase
in TFP growth. However, all would be expected
to have a gradual effect on TFP, raising the growth
rate by a small amount over an extended period.
In fact, the TFP data display a very steady trend
during the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s; then a
very abrupt increase, occurring entirely in 2003;
and then a return to the previous growth trend
thereafter (Figure 10). This behavior is somewhat
puzzling and hard to reconcile with explanations
that rely on a lagged impact of IT spending during
the late 1990s. We interpret the abrupt increase
as a one-time boost to productivity engendered
by the IT revolution—the burst of investment in
IT capital allowed firms to raise their efficiency
to a higher level but not to permanently increase
the rate of productivity growth. Our estimate of
potential TFP includes an adjustment that tem-
porarily raises its growth rate to include a level
shift similar to that shown in Figure 10.
CONCLUSION
Potential output is a difficult variable to esti-
mate largely because it is an unobservable concept.
There are many ways to compute the economy’s
productive potential. Some methods rely on
purely statistical techniques. Others, including
the CBO method, rely on statistical procedures
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Figure 9
Investment in Producers’ Durable Equipmentgrounded in economic theory. However, all of
the methods have difficulty estimating the trend
in GDP near the end of the data sample, which is
usually the period of greatest interest. Because the
trend at the end of the data sample is the trend
that is projected into the future, any errors in
estimating the end-of-sample trend will be carried
forward into the projection. The process is further
complicated by factors that alter the interpretation
of recent economic events, including data revi-
sions and structural change.
In addition to describing the CBO method and
highlighting the pros and cons of our approach,
this paper describes how we dealt with some
developments during the past several years that
complicated estimation of potential output. As a
general principle, we try to make our estimate
of potential output as objective as possible, but
as this review of recent problems indicates, esti-
mating potential GDP in real time often involves
weighing contradictory evidence. Deciding
whether or not, or how much, to change a trend
growth rate for TFP, for example, often has a
large effect on the estimate of potential for the
medium term.
This review demonstrates that the economic
landscape is continually changing and that esti-
mates of the trend in any variable, including
potential GDP, are affected by those changes.
Oftentimes, what looks like a new trend in a series
disappears after successive revisions. This factor
argues for a conservative approach to estimating
such trends and being judicious about changes
in those trends.
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